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Essay Review 
The Fate of Constitutional Ipse Dixits 
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982 .. Pp .. 285 .. $15.95 
William W Van Alstyne 
The first third of Constztutional Fate introduces the reader to a serial 
review of five "styles" of constitutional argument.. Essentially, these are. 
differing (but not mutually exclusive) ways of what Philip Bobbitt describes 
as orthodox or conventional ways of testing the substantive constitutionality 
of some challenged federal or state law. Specifically, the typologies of 
argument he reviews are "textual," "historical," "doctrinal," "prudential," 
and "structuraL" This survey is generally instructive and interesting.. It is 
quite similar in its own way to John Ely's critical restatement of different 
methods of attempting to "discover fundamental values" insofar as certain 
clauses-such as the due process, equal protection, privileges-and-immuni-
ties clauses, or the Ninth Amendment-appear to press that task upon us. 1 
Indeed, Constitutional Fate is in one sense a sequel and a response to John 
Ely's book. Like Ely, Bobbitt seeks some defensible basis for the constitu7 
tiona 1 adjudication of awkward cases, i.e., cases usually litigated under the 
most normative clauses of the Constitution such as those just noted .. While 
seeing the problem from a different perspective (namely one that first 
examines the adequacy of constitutional review when attempted on the basis 
of these five differing approaches), Bobbitt also concludes that none finally 
does the job of rationalizing the full scope of significant and legitimate 
judicial constitutional review .. Each conventional form of argument (i.e.,the 
"textual," the "historical") has something useful to contribute, the author 
says, but all come up short in the end. 
The introductory chapter, however, is but a prologue .. Its principal 
function is to provide the background for an additional type of constitutiona)-
argument; this type, Bobbitt suggests, has in fact been used in a large 
number of the Supreme Court's most significant constitutional adjudica-
tions, although (until now) not properly discerned, developed, and defended. 
This new type of argument he calls "ethical" argument, and this one he also 
relates to his view of appropriate Supreme Court role (namely the role of 
"expressive" function) which is quite close to the advocacy of Owen Fiss. 2 
Ethical argument, Bobbitt proposes, succeeds in the crucial area that the 
conventional typologies of constitutional argument leave incomplete. It 
William W. Van Alstyne is Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law 
John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Press, 1980) 
2. Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev I (1979) 
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takes over where they falter or do not wor k. It explains much that previously 
appeared to be obscure It also purports to meet the difficulty that led Ely to 
urge courts to eschew "fundamental rights" jurisprudence in constitutional 
, adjudication (except to the extent of forwarding Ely's own notion of 
"representation reinforcing" rights) .. 
"Ethical" argument, Bobbitt writes, does not mean simply principled 
argument, i.e., it is not to be contrasted with "unethical" argument.. Rather, 
it is argument that appeals to and/or draws from the "ethos" of the 
American polity .. It is derived from some informed sense of the "sort of 
people we are" (p .. 93), and in this respect it is (allegedly) grounded in 
something firmer, something more intimate to this particular culture, as it 
were, than other kinds of constitutional jurisprudence which simply appeal 
to some higher or better law at large .. Allegedly, it is exogenous to any 
particular constitutional clause or to any combination of clauses, yet it is felt 
on the edges of many clauses and virtually presupposed in certain tacit 
assumptions of the whole Constitution .. The greater part of Bobbitt's book is 
devoted to a combined illustration-and-persuasion that: (l) there is such a 
species of argument (i .. e .. , ethical argument) embedded in a great deal of the 
best constitutional case law; (2) it is thoroughly legitimate; (3) it is not just a 
new way of imposing some amorphous "moralism" on the Constitution 
(pp .. 94, 100, 108); and (4) its more systematic recognition by the Supreme 
Court would in fact contribute enormously to the appropriate function of 
that Court-an "expressive" function of this polity's ethos or ethology 
(wherein "ethology" is understood to refer more to a set of fundamental 
values reflected in the culture we have than to some merely anthropological 
definition of ethology). 3 
3 To the extent that the notion of "ethical argument" is meant to confine the field of 
ascertaining fundamental values in the adjudication of unspecified rights to those sorts of 
particular values rooted in examples strongly supported by the history of American (or at 
least western) culture, enabling the Supreme Coun to take seriously some claims of 
privileges and immunities or of Ninth Amendment equally-implied rights on equivalent 
terms as certain specified rights (e.g, speech or the free exercise of religion), without 
simultaneously opening wide the door to a nonjusticiable parade of moral claims at large, 
Bobbitt's argument is an instance of an old and excellent idea dressed up in new words It 
may well provide a useful suggestion, but it is a suggestion without novelty The dilemma 
of the "higher law background" of portions of the Constitution is scarcely new, and even 
some of the most skeptical judges who have served on the Supreme Court have declined to 
ignore it or to resolve it by a simplistic "either-or" alternative (i.e., either it admits to the 
pantheon of preferred protection anything for which a convincing argument can be made 
that an enlightened society ought to respect, or, insofar as that test is too treacherous and 
subjective, it must be avoided and courts must reject all claims other than those based 
squarely on narrowly conceived, textually explicit rights) .. For example, though the dissent 
of Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905), is routinely invoked as the 
most famous of all judicial expressions of unqualified rejection of permission to judges to 
roam at large in the universe of moral philosophy as the basis for second-guessing 
legislative preferences, Holmes himself quite explicitly qualified it with a much-neglected 
"unless" clause With emphasis added, it admits the logic of permitting litigant reliance 
upon unspecified rights traditionally prized and generally respected in the past practices 
and preferences of this culture, as the appropriate field of external references in adjudicating 
such claims under appropriate parts of our Constitution Thus, the full Holmes quotation 
reads: "I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe 
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and 
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The author's attempt, however, to establish the free-standing credentials 
and clarity of this new thing-"ethical" argument-altogether failed forme 
as a reader, beginning with the author's own selected test case .. ("The real test. 
of ethical arguments," he declares, "is in their application to concrete cases" 
(p .. 154) .. ) That test case is Roe v. Wade,4 the Supreme Court'shighiy 
controversial abortion decision Bobbitt first gives an extremely abbreviated 
summary of the case, dispatching the Court's effort to explain the outcome 
of Roe with what is now (in academic circles) o!>ligatory criticism, and 
abruptly dismissing Justice Blackmun's best efforts as a "doctrinal fiasco" 
(p .. 159) .. He then proposes to show, nonetheless, how the result would not be 
a doctrinal fiasco (but indeed would be utterly convincing) if Blackmun\; 
opinion had instead employed "ethical argument." The demonstration 
begins (at p .. 159) in this fashion: 
I propose this rule Government may not coerce intimate acts 
From that "I propose," it takes Bobbitt but six short pages to explain how 
much better Roe would have been had it proceeded from such beginnings~ 
The entire modus operandi is breathtakingly simple .. It yields a result much 
less equivocal than Roe itself .. An "ethical" argument (which is what his 'ii 
propose" rule purports to be) provides an "absolute bar" (p. 163), and not 
merely a consideration to be taken seriously. Accordingly, if being compelled 
to continue carrying an unwanted fetus under threat of criminal sanction is 
something government may not require of a woman because it coerces an 
intimate act, then that ends the discussion .. Whatever the state's interest, 
"our" view of what government may not do (namely, that it may not coerce 
intimate acts) has already closed it off from seeking to influence child birth 
decisions by criminalizing abortions .. "The ethical argument I have given 
avoids the necessity," Bobbitt declares, of such unseemly tasks as balancing 
whether the fetal life being carried requires some constraint on the woman-
including a constraint that may indeed "coerce" her in carrying the fetus 
longer than she wished (p .. 163). 
Some may find Bobbitt's own chosen example convincing .. Some, even as 
I, may find the demonstration vastly more troubling than Justice Blackmun's 
our law." The references to "our" people and to "our" laws is presumably deliberate. Of 
course it is ethnocentric as well, and in that sense it should be the logical source of Bobbitt's 
nonstandard definition of "ethical" It is Holmes-not William Douglas as is so commonly 
and wrongly supposed from the many and unfair disparaging references to the Douglas 
opinion in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (l96.5)-who also employed the word 
"penumbra" to make a valid point about the uncertain margins of constitutional clauses: 
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and 
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading 
gradually from one extreme to the other" (Springer v. Philippine Islands, 227 U.s 189,209 
[1982], dissenting opinion.) Thus, judges committed to the task of interpreting the. 
Constitution we have (rather than some other that today's authors may deem better) 
nonetheless need not come to the task with a cramped or wizened view of what it does ind~ed 
provide. For a more elaborate discussion, see William W Van Alstyne, Interpreting this 
Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. 
Fla L Rev. 209 (1983). 
4 410 U.s.. 113 (1973) 
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different effort in Roe, whatever its own analytic shortcomings., Taken on its 
own terms, moreover, the Bobbitt technique of discovering constitutional 
"ethics" just seems to be hopelessly arbitrary as actually applied" The basic 
technique appears literally to be one of mere audience consent.. The author 
first proposes a "rule" at an unobjectionable level of congenial abstraction; 
he then proceeds to elicit (tacit) audience concurrence that "we" agree to 
instances of its easy application, eg, that public school teachers could not 
require "students to perform sex acts as part of a sex education" (p" 160); he 
pauses to ascertain by audience silence that we really do agree with the 
example; he asks (rhetorically) on what basis we can be so sure-and then 
declares that the "barriers must be constitutional it would seem to account 
for our sense of absolute prohibition,," Then the device is to move at once to 
the observation that "whatever else may be an intimate act, carrying a child 
within one's body and giving birth must be a profoundly intimate act," from 
which it then follows, Q"E . .D:, that antiabortion statutes are unconstitutionaL 
All of this is so peremptory, however, that one scarcely knows how it was 
permitted even to get underway,. Specifically, there is no reason why "this 
rule" that Bobbitt proposed (and from which the rest issued with automatic 
ease) was the one he proposed, rather than some other that would yield an 
exactly opposite outcome For instance, I suppose his audience would have 
equally agreed silently to concur if, instead, he had said: 
I propose this rule: A compassionate government need not permit one person to kill 
another 
He would similarly "test" it with easy cases, check with the audience to see 
they agree with the easy cases, ask how they can be certain, suggest it must be 
because the rule must be constitutionally based to account for our confidence, 
show how it is in fact implicated when an unthreatening, dependent, 
unculpable fetal life may be killed, from which it then equally follows, 
Q"E,D,., that virtually every kind of antiabortion statute is constitutionaL 
The exercise involves reasoning from incomplete premises" It clearly is not 
serious philosophy, much less disciplined constitutional law., Insofar as its 
appeal is to the character, or ethos, of the American polity, or to hortatory 
resolutions that "comport with the sort of people we are," moreover, one 
would expect it would pay at least some serious attention to the complexity 
of that appeaL Here, for instance, in a most interesting state supreme court 
decision from 1907, are some perfectly lovely passages that purport to apply 
a more complicated orientation (i,.e,., the common-law orientation) in 
drawing distinctions as to when one may not act to worsen the condition of 
another, though in other circumstances one would have had no obligation to 
help: 
Whenever a person is in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious that, if 
he does not use due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that person, the duty at 
once arises to exercise care commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds 
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid danger, It protects the trespasser 
from wanton or Willful inJury It extends to the licensee, and requires the exercise of 
reasonable care to avoid an unnecessary injury to him It imposes upon the owner of 
premises, which he expressly or impliedly invites persons to visit, whether for the 
transaction of business or otherwise, the obligation to keep the same in reasonably safe 
condition for use The rule stated is supported by a long list of authorities, both in 
33 Journal of Legal Ed, No.4-6 
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England and this country, and expressed in the familiar maxim, "Sic utere tuo," etc It 
applies wzth greater strictness to conduct towards persons under disability, and imposes 
the obligation as a matter of law, not merely sentiment, at least to refram from any 
affirmative action that mzght result m injury to them [Emphasis added] 
These passages are excerpted from DePue v. Flateau,5 quite a famous tort 
case from Minnesota .. They concern a man who failed to get home in his 
carriage on a cold January afternoon, after visiting several farmers from 
whom he bought livestock. At the last farm he visited, though feeling unwell 
after dinner, he was refused lodgings and assisted to his carriage,. He 
subsequently sought to recover for the loss of several fingers frostbitten 
during the hours spent unconscious in a snowbank. The trial court, finding 
no duty on the farmer's part to have permitted him to stay, found 
accordingly no liability for the plaintiff's pain and loss .. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court found otherwise .. 
All the pertinent comparisons for a different analysis of Roe v. Wade are 
available in these few dated passages,. Though the visitor's presence was not 
the responsibility of the farmer initially, still when "it is obvious that, if one 
does not use due care in one's own conduct it may cause injury to that 
person, the duty at once arises to exercise care commensurate with the 
situation in which one finds oneself," Note that the rule "protects (even) the 
trespasser from wanton or willful injury .. " Note that it imposes upon the 
"owner of premises" some obligation to continue to provide shelter to the 
unwanted visitor at least while the peril outside remains very great.. Note, 
also, it applies with "greater strictness to conduct towards persons under 
disability, and imposes," too, "the obligation as a matter of law, not mere 
sentiment, at least to refrain from any affirmative action that might result in 
injury to them,." All these things, one might say, are bound up in the 
common-law "ethology" of this polity, ie, they retIed (to quote Bobbitt) 
the "sort of people we are,." They are but an explication of that more general 
maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas, 
The clear analogical relevance of these passages for the counter-result of 
Roe v, Wade is obvious .. Even as against a "trespassing" fetus (i,.e." a fetus 
lodged in the "premises" by rape?), one must take care to avoid wanton or 
willful injury,. The duty runs to the owner of the "premises" in which the 
dependent party finds itself .. It applies most of all on behalf of persons under 
disability., We scarcely need amend the Latin maxim to read its rhythm and 
to apply its rhyme: sic utere utero tuo, ut alienum non laedas,. So it seems' 
that Bobbitt has himself adventitiously suggested at least as forceful an 
"ethical" argument for precisely the opposite conclusion as the one 
"proved" by his original formulation, in his own first-chosen test case of the 
clarity and excellence of this formulation,. 
II 
But of course none of this will do at all. None of it simplifies Roev. Wade. 
The case is very hard,. A judge who (like Blackmun?) acknowledges the 
difficulties of the case invites abuse and derision, He will necessarily write an 
5 .. 100 Minn .. 299, III Nw. U. L Rev. 1(1907) 
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opinion that can be readily pushed around But in comparison with what we 
have been offered here, at least, it is not necessarily worse on that account.. 
Blackmun's opinion, unlike Bobbitt's, did confront the obvious conflict.. 
It recognized that the protection of dependent human life is suitably 
"compelling" as a sufficient, superordinating justification of state anti-
abortion statutes .. It recognized, too, that since the death of the fetus is an 
immediate and certain consequence of the usual early abortion medical 
procedure, there are not in fact a lot of "less intrusive" alternative means by 
which the state might cope with the dilemma .. Thus the collision of a 
woman's intensely personal choice with the most conventional of all police 
power concerns was forthrightly admitted in Blackmun's presentation of the 
case .. To his credit, moreover, Blackmun did not pull from the air some 
casually handy epigram; he did not dispatch the conflict between the 
woman's interest and the asserted social interest (in fetal-life protection) as 
though it were resolvable by some self-evident syllogism, some single-
minded "I propose" rule, or some obvious Euclidean proof. 
The problem was, rather, the problematic sufficiency of fetal life under the 
circumstances of the case .. The problem was, as well, the bona fides of the 
State of Texas's assertions about its anti-abortion statute .. Each claim (by 
Texas) was in fact seriously questionable A brief review of each matter will 
help us remember why .. 
In respect to the sufficiency of fetal life, this matter could hardly be 
resolved merely by "deciding" (or, rather, deferring uncrztically to a state's 
decision of) "when potential human life begins," whether one's emphasis is 
on "potentzal," or on "human," or on "life,," For, as to that matter, not only 
are unmated sex cells (gametes) a variety of "potential human life" (the 
prevention-of-mating of which had been dealt with as a matter of precedent 
in Griswold v .. Connecticut,6 which holds invalid an anticontraceptive 
statute), but so, of course, are mere random cells from the human body .. The 
DNA necessary for complete replication of the host human lies coiled within 
every cell; in that interesting sense, one may allow that a vast number of 
double-helixed homunculi reside in potential populations of billions in 
each person. In cloning (now already successfully undertaken with mammals 
as well as with amphibians), merely the cytoplasm of a single sex cell is used .. 
The sex cell nucleus is taken out and thrown away .. In its place, the nucleus 
from a random blastular tell is inserted, and the process of asexual 
reproduction at once commences, with the adult constituting a genetic copy 
of the single parent. 
Equivalently, although some religions think it dispositive, the initial 
merging of sex cells (whether in fallopian tubes or in glass dishes, "in 
vitro"), could hardly impress a judge as familiar with this subject as 
Blackmun had become, as the critical event within the state's dispositive 
discretion. For what in fact is going on here? Initially, the opening 
detectable event (the meeting between crowding, flagellating, microscopic 
sperm and an ovum) appears as but a trivial chemical modification at the 
surface of the ovum membrane: an alteration signaling merely that the othe~ 
6. 381 U.5.. 479 (1965) 
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crowding sperm are closed out, and that none can additionally penetrate (I:t 
phenomenon with the name of "refractory halo") .. Additional trivia follow 
which we categorize by words that mislead; each separate word thereby 
suggests a distinctive state whereas in fact we innovate words to have 
something in common to say to one another (although the actual flow of 
events is more subtle, more continuing): "prophase," then "anaphase," and 
"metaphase," the drifting of chromosomal material toward ends of a 
spindle, an alignment, and then, with "telophase," a beginning in the. 
cellular wall marking the preliminary, still microscopic dichotomy into two 
conjoined cells 
These two, conjoined, apparently identical cells are just that, nothing less, 
nothing more .. Yet, Texas asserted that the very first detectable chemical 
alteration (the sealing of the ovum membrane) was at once more than 
enough to apply DePue v. Flateau, as it were, with criminal intensity The 
host must provide incubation, nutrition, carrying, delivery (and presumably 
support obligations to adulthood) for the mitotic zygote, whatever the 
circumstances of the incident (including rape), whatever the damaged 
condition of the single cell (or its teratological aftermath), whatever the 
mental or economic status of the "host," whatever the number already 
dependent upon her, and assuming only that her own bare life would not be 
jeopardized by the compulsory state service to which she is thus conscripted. 
(Under this Texas view, incidentially, IUDs would be criminalized-IUDs 
may work by precluding lodgment of the blastula in the uterus, rather than 
by precluding mated gametes-as of course would any "morning after" pill 
or the like .. ) The harsh benignity of Texas, in the "welfare" of every zygote, is 
the state's asserted compelling justification.. This is a harsh view indeed-a 
severe and peculiar idea of the right way of distributing criminal punish-
ments 
We are (at this stage) even far short of the mere blastula, i .. e., the 
multiplication of yet undifferentiated cells, in somewhat gelatinous appear-
ance, to the stage of shaping in roughly tubular form. We are still months 
short of "ensoulment" (the time-approximately the eightieth day-"-the 
nineteenth century Catholic church somehow "knew" that a soul was 
infused into the homuncular form) .. We have not yet even come to 
"nidation" (usually between the eighth and the fourteenth day), when 
possible fixing of the developing blastula may occur in the uterine walL We 
are months short of the time any detectable electrical activity will occur in 
the specialized cephalic region (usually about the fourth month, coinciden-
tally about the same time as "quickening," at which sensations of movement 
can be felt) .. There is even an additional irony of oversight in the last fact. 
The same state's laws may regard one as "dead" upon the cessation of 
discernible electrical activity in the brain, but nonetheless conscript every 
woman's body at the opposite end of the process upon the mere penetration 
of a flagellating sperm into the chemically-sensitive but (evidently) otherwise 
indifferent ovum7 
7 The comparison and an excellent discussion is provided in a recent student note, Ken 
Martyn, Technological Advances and Roe v Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 
U C L A. L Rev. 1194 (1982) 
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The constitutional criminalization of woman's choice on such a founda-
tion (of zygoted sanctity) was radically unconvincing., The Supreme Court 
(in Roe) resolved the quandary neither by deferring wholly to Texas nor by 
deferring wholly to each woman. Rather, it resolved the quandary by noting 
that the one "person" zndubztably affected by the outcome was the woman 
carrying the now-gamete, now-zygote, now-blastula, now-embryo, now-
fetus, now-infant The state's hubris in foreclosing her own resolution of her 
own pregnancy was disallowed prior to that date later-than-which a very 
substantial consensus could reasonably maintain that it (i.,e." the exclusivity 
of her own choice) would indeed be too heedless of others" On quasi-
historical grounds, the Court settled that date as the date of fetal viability, 
roughly the seventh month following the original gametic conjunction., One 
may well believe that that date ("viability") is unduly permissive (e.,g." there 
may be a strong case that significant brain activity in the fetus may mark the 
line the state might draw)" Nonetheless, the way Texas had drawn it, unless 
one frankly wants to concede to the state an authority to enact a religious 
bias, had virtually nothing to say for itself" In a larger sense, Roe v., Wade 
was a case of DePue v., Flateau made extreme: the state enacting a rule 
conscripting the utmost private premises for the gestation of zygotes and 
blastulas., Against the combination of countervailing constitutional clauses 
(they may include the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth, the 
Fourth, and indeed the Ninth, as well as the establishment clause of the 
First), the rationale of Texas was inadequate., That in the particular case 
(albeit not in the record and not a feature of the Court's opinion) the 
pseudonymous plaintiff was pregnant by rape, merely underscored the 
essential melodrama of the dispute. 
III 
Additionally, however, there was also an extremely strong reason for 
doubting the bona fides of the principal ("life-saving") defense Texas 
claimed for its antiabortion statute The point is not obvious from 
Blackmun's opinion for the Court, but it is readily discoverable by reading 
principal briefs and the oral arguments in the case8 It turned out that in fact 
Texas had not actually criminalized the abortion decision of women in 
Texas., Rather, Texas had criminalized only acts by doctors in Texas, i.e,it 
forbade them from assisting any woman in' effecting an abortion except 
when the woman's life was in jeopardy" It enacted that restriction on medical 
practice, moreover, in 1845" The evidence was highly suggestive that the 
reason for doing so (in 1845) was because of misgivings respecting the 
medical safety of abortion procedures and not because of any view respecting 
the abortion of blastulas, embryos, or fetuses as such" The woman could 
travel out of the state and secure medical assistance in a different jurisdiction 
to effect an abortion" If she could get medical assistance within Texas to 
effect an abortion, moreover, she was not chargeable even as an accessory to 
the physician's (medical) wrongdoing., As observed in the briefs and oral 
8 See, eg, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Constitutional Law, eds Philip B Kurland & Gerhard Casper, ~ol 27 (Arlington, Va: 
Univ" Publications of America, Inc, 1973) 
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argument as well, thousands of women residents of Texas in fact had 
traveled to New York for abortions, without risk of prosecution (or of 
"blame") under the presupposition of the Texas statute. That statute forbade 
only a certain kind of in-state medical service .. 
As a statute enacted because of misgivings respecting the professional 
safety of abortion procedures (in mid-nineteenth century), the premises of 
the statute have been virtually overwhelmed. No similar basis for such 
misgivings existed more than a century later As a practical matter, the 
statute operated to foreclose lawful abortions principally to women too poor 
and/or too ignorant to travel lawfully to New York, North Carolina, 
Colorado, or elsewhere 
In context, however inelevant these matters may now seem (or how they 
have been made irrelevant by the Supreme Court's gratuitously sweeping 
opinion), they nonetheless bore directly on the matters we have been 
reviewing .. Recall that the "quandary" was framed in terms of the extent to 
which the Supreme Court should presume to interpose interpretations of 
rather vague constitutional provisions against the apparent consensus of a 
state legislature in asserting when protectable-third-party-life is sufficiently 
involved to exact a strong view of the common-law principle involved in 
DePue v .. Flateau .. But the record in the case strongly suggests that in fact no 
such quandary was present; Texas had not made any such judgment. 
Accordingly, the idea that the woman's interests should have been set aside 
in favor of the Texas statute on the basis of "defening" to "majoritarian" 
notions of protecting zygotal-blastular-embryonic-fetal "life," wouldhave 
been mistaken .. The essence of the Texas statute was that (1) it effectively 
limited medically-safe abortions to the reasonably well-to-do residents of 
Texas on (2) a cunently-counterfactual predicate of medical procedures 
concerned with women's safe treatment. 
The frailties of the Blackmun opinion, such as they were, were thus not 
that he eschewed Bobbitt's preference for "ethical" argument Rather, they 
were almost entirely in their arguably-inappropriate "advisory" features: the 
opinion went exceedingly beyond the very compelling context of the case at 
hand and the facial weaknesses of the Texas statute, it addressed considera-
tions not present at the time, and it has accordingly provoked enormous 
reaction to the manner,in which it thereby presumed generally to "legislate" 
the constitutionality of antiabortion laws at large. Probably the temptation 
to compose a broad and categorical opinion was very strong at the time (to 
provide "guidance," to "clear the air," to discourage subsequent attempts to 
distinguish and limit Roe itself?), but its sheer sweep does leave it critically 
vulnerable as so much of the subsequent academic comment reflects, 
On the other hand, the opinion did not presume to resolve the basic case 
by recourse to mere epigram, or by recourse to such audience-consensus 
bromides as this sort of here-is-the-answer "ethic" (namely, "I propose this 
rule .. Government may not coerce intimate acts") .. To the contrary, in major 
portions of his opinion Blackmun faced the collision of conflicting views 
with an admirable directness, Doubtless that extreme candor invited some of 
the criticism he (and his opinion) have since received .. But it was also a. 
degree of candor which commands respect.. Bobbitt's alternative attempt to 
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"write" a better opinion, in his own selected test case, seemed to me to be a 
substantial failure .. 
IV 
Others may find it best just to disregard this one example of misapplied 
ethical argument, of course, and to judge the balance of the argument (on 
"ethical argument" and "expressive judicial function") without tying into 
the example at alL The thought might well be right for the same reason that 
few of us necessarily want our general propositions to stand or fall simply on 
the strength of one example, even when the example is one we ourselves have 
composed .. But I tried this too, and again it just did not work out In those 
portions of the book where the example of "ethical argument" seemed to 
work well, my own conclusion was that it worked well solely by the accident 
that it had the benefit of reinforcement from additional and much stronger 
considerations that either had not occurred to the author or, for whatever 
reasons, were left out of account.9 Similarly, in virtually all instances in 
which the case under discussion lacked the reinforcement of considerations 
not noted by the author, ie, cases in which the "ethical argument" had to 
stand unaided, it just failed .. It appeared to collapse into constitutional 
ad j udication-by-mere-a udience-consen L 
Nonetheless, a very great deal of current book writing, ostensibly on 
constitutional law, is substantially of this sort. Much of it (Bobbitt's book 
included) has been very favorably received .. There appears to be a nominal 
consensus that this is indeed productive and useful constitutional scholar-
ship-that somehow its basic approach is sound, whether or not any 
particular author has got THE theory that will sweep the field clean .. I am 
extremely doubtful that anything of the sort is at all likely to occur however, 
and there is little in Constitutional Fate that will shake the doubts of those 
not already convinced to the contrary. 
9 The author, for example, suggests at p .. 101 that "ethical argument" best explains how we 
can be certain that a president may not establish a national church by simple executive 
order, although the establishment clause of the First Amendment lays no such restriction 
upon the president and is, rather, addressed in haec verba only to Congress. But a president 
would find it very hard indeed to find any executive power in Article II-either express or 
implied-enabling him to attempt by mere executive order that which the First Amendment 
forbids Congress to do by enactment of any kind .. Unless, then, something very odd is meant 
by the phrase "establishing a national church," the president is simply out of luck. 
Consistent with determining the proper separation of powers pursuant to Articles I, II, and 
III, and consistent also with a sensible interpretative use of the First Amendment, the proper 
conclusion would be that if a national church were to be established it would have to be 
done by Congress-and Congress is itself forbidden to do so either directly (i e ,on its own 
account) or indirectly (i e , by authorizing the president to do so) 
